Europe’s Untapped Sway in Syria - Paper

Rime Allaf, November 18, 2020

50 years of the Assad regime:

An analysis of the European Union's policy towards Syria

November 16, 2020 marks 50 years to the military coup that brought Hafez Assad to power in Syria. Dubbed the “Corrective Movement” by his regime, the coup allowed the Assad family to consolidate the control of the Baath Party. In the 20 years Bashar Assad has been in power, how did the European Union's policy towards Syria develop under his leadership? Have past lessons been learned? And what's still in for Europe in the Syrian conflict?

Download the paper: https://www.kas.de/en/web/syrien-irak/single-title/-/content/europe-s-untapped-sway-in-syria

1 Half a Century of Regression

November 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the military coup which brought Hafez Assad to power in Syria. Dubbed the “Corrective Movement” by his regime(1), the coup allowed Assad to consolidate the control of the Baath Party, itself in power since 1963, guiding it to gradually encroach control over every aspect of Syrians’ lives through an indoctrination system beginning in primary school. With socialist and pan-Arab slogans, Assad appropriated Damascus as his “beating heart of Arabism” and made this the leitmotiv of his rule.

The trajectory of the regime’s gradual descent into absolute authoritarianism is well documented, as is its notorious meddling in the region, foremost in Lebanon, and around the world - including in the notorious attempt to bomb an El Al flight in 1986, known as the Hindawi affair (2). Following an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood and a massacre in Hama, said to have killed up to 40,000 people under the orders of the dictator’s brother, Rifat Assad (3), the worst was yet to come for Syrians; they lived in total isolation, cut off from the Arab world because of the regime’s support for Iran in its war with Iraq (the only Arab country to do so, despite the self-proclaimed Arabism), and denied most human rights and basic necessities like regular access to water or electricity.

It was only a US wish for a pan-Arab participation in the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 (4), and the subsequent launch of the unprecedented Madrid Peace Process, that finally brought Assad back into the respectable international fold; this paved the way for his son Bashar to take power smoothly in 2000, turning Syria into the region’s first hereditary republic. For the first time since 1970, many Syrians thought that they were turning a corner, and that the apple would fall far from the tree. The next decade would quickly show them it hadn’t, and in the years that followed, they realized the son would even exceed his father’s brutality.

1.1 Bashar’s Tumultuous First Decade

Relative to the perceived maturity of Assad senior’s policies, Assad junior’s first decade in power showed the limitations of inexperience, with his predilection for rash judgements paired with unmeasured conceit. On the domestic front, the buzz about increased freedoms, marketed by core Assad loyalists, was quickly smashed by Assad’s intolerance for dissent and his heavy-handed response to calls for reform. Numerous civil society activists, writers and intellectuals were silenced and jailed, accused of threatening national security when they dared to speak of human rights and freedom of expression.(5)

With the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration began to depict Assad as a low-hanging fruit (6) following his open defiance of the US and his open support for armed resistance to foreign troops in Iraq. While military action was never really considered, the US nevertheless promptly passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, pulling the rope a little tighter on Assad in the hope this would change his behavior.(7)

Bashar Assad also instigated a sequence of events with the other uneasy neighbor, forcing Lebanese politicians to unconstitutionally extend the presidential term of the incumbent, Emile Lahoud. This was an ill-advised diktat, as Assad could have ensured the loyalty of numerous candidates rather than impose Lahoud.(8) This triggered international condemnation and the adoption of the Franco-American sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2005(9), calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. The humiliating retreat of Syrian troops followed, weeks after the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri which was immediately blamed on Syria and its ally, Hezbollah.

The Lebanon debacle was accompanied domestically by a renewed campaign against critics of the regime, particularly those who dared to voice solidarity with Lebanese peers.(10) Isolated from most of the Arab world once again, the Assad regime found unexpected relief in the aftermath of the Israeli war on Hezbollah in 2006; with Israel unable to crush the Iranian-backed militia, the latter successfully paralyzed Lebanon, turning its arms on fellow Lebanese in a drastic and bloody reversal of stated positions,(11) and becoming the kingmaker in a Qatar-hosted agreement in 2008(12). Against all odds, Bashar Assad was once again rehabilitated through his partnership with Hezbollah, taking his place among world leaders in Paris at the invitation of President Nicolas Sarkozy for the July 14 parade.

Less than three years later, before a popular uprising erupted in southern Syria and spread like wildfire over the country, Bashar Assad assumed he was invincible.

Having repeatedly survived numerous upheavals unscathed, he boasted in February 2011 to the Wall Street Journal about his country’s stability while the Arab Spring moved around the region.(13) A few weeks later, the fuse had been lit in Daraa with the imprisonment and torture of young boys who had written on their school wall: It’s your turn, Doctor.(14)

1.2 Bashar’s Ruthless Second Decade

When Syrian civilians turned into revolutionaries, braving the regime despite knowing its formidable power and its proven willingness to violently crush any dissent, they assumed that the international community would not allow another Hama, nor remain idle as it watched civilians be slaughtered. Syrians expected that the regime which had been designated as a sponsor of terrorism for decades would be warned and stopped dead in its tracks, following years of rhetoric on the need to reform. They quickly realized no help was coming their way; nevertheless, they persisted.

The astounding death toll and destruction at the hands of Assad and his allies have created a new reality in the region and beyond, with absolutely no evidence that it is possible to turn back the clock and regain a semblance of normalcy.

Actual figures are estimates at best, undercounts at worst. Even though the United Nations declared it would stop counting the number of victims early in the war, claiming accurate figures were difficult to get, the then-special envoy Stefan De Mistura stated in April 2016 that the number of deaths had already reached at least 400,000. This conservative estimate was given before the bulk of Russia’s bombing campaign and the regime’s violent assaults on Aleppo later that year, on Ghouta in 2018, and on Idlib as of 2019.(15)

Syrian civil society organizations and international human rights organizations, however, have been keeping close count and according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, this war has already killed at least 586,000 Syrians.(16) Moreover, the regime and its allies’ atrocities have been thoroughly documented by numerous independent observers, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, which estimates the death toll to top 560,000.(17)

If the last twenty years of Bashar Assad’s reign have shown anything, it is that the country’s stability thus far had only been ensured by drastic repression and by international wavering on Syria. The economy was adapted to benefit only Assad cronies, while basic infrastructure, education and health were deteriorating at an alarming speed, accompanied by a high population growth rate, rampant unemployment, and a new generation coming of age with absolutely no prospects for even the simple life their parents had.

With or without the Arab Spring, Syria had long been on the slippery path to implosion.

1.3 Flawed Conclusions

In spite of these shocking developments, at the 50th anniversary of the Assad regime’s power grab in Syria, and coming up to 10 years after the popular uprising of March 2011 and ensuing war, a chorus of European voices is countering Syrians in the opposition and civil society by playing devil’s advocate in a literal way, arguing for an acceptance of what is called “facts on the ground.”

This narrative simplistically advocates that after the regime’s military victory and reconquest of a large part of Syria, it may be time to recalibrate Europe’s (and the world’s) approach to the Assad regime, with a de facto recognition of Assad as the Syrian leader and a lifting of sanctions “to help Syrians” who are hurting from them much more than the regime.

Further, the narrative argues that a significant European contribution to the reconstruction of Syria is necessary in order to allow for a repatriation of Syrian refugees from their European bases, now that their security is allegedly no longer an issue.

In other words, Syria is described as a post-war case and Assad is marketed as a necessary evil, if that.

Such arguments seem to rest solidly on wishful thinking to get rid of Syrians in Europe, and to prevent others from attempting to find asylum there. They have, however, absolutely no relation to current realities or prospects for the future. For most Syrians, with half a century’s worth of evidence to support their position, the Assad regime remains the worst possible alternative, and its continued hold on power remains an impediment to their return.(18) For the time being, the EU’s official position remains that “conditions inside Syria at present do not lend themselves to the promotion of large-scale voluntary return, in conditions of safety and dignity in line with international law.“(19)

There is much Europe could have done – and there is still much it can do now – to mitigate some of the ravages of the last ten years in Syria and around Syria. As Syrians fled the brutality of Assad and his allies, Europe was generous with its purse strings but stingy with its support for the very principles it preaches on human rights, accountability, justice, and democracy.

Of course, the European Union is a massive institution whose decisions hinge on – and are often slowed down by – the policies of its sovereign members. Nevertheless, it has a President of the European Commission, a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and numerous senior officials who have sway and whose job it is to work for the collective interests of the Union. They need to reconsider their position and evaluate new courses of action.

After fifty years of brutal Assadism which have afflicted not only Syrians and their neighbors, but have also created waves across the Mediterranean, the time is ripe for a reassessment of European policies towards the Syria conflict, if only for long-term European interests. For the European Union, taking a leading role in solving Syria is not only a matter of foreign policy: it is a matter of strategic interest and domestic security, both of which will remain unattainable while Assad remains in power.

2 Europe’s Decade of Chosen Passivity

The twenty-first century had started well for Bashar Assad, whose ascent to power seemed to be sanctioned by most world leaders, particularly French President Jacques Chirac, the only world leader to attend the funeral of Hafez Assad in June 2000. With French support, Syria was supposed to engage in serious reforms on economic and administrative platforms, and eventually on a political level. The frustration from Paris was replicated in other EU capitals, however, as Bashar Assad quickly showed his true colors domestically and regionally.

2.1 The Elusive EU Association Agreement

The EU’s early frustrations with Syria started with Assad’s dithering on the EU Association Agreement(20) and his refusal to accept the inclusion of references to human rights and to weapons of mass destruction. But in a manner typical of Assad diplomacy, the Syrian regime suddenly showed eagerness for the Association Agreement when its regional and international standing was at risk, or worse. Hence, in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, the regime would have welcomed signing the Agreement. But in 2006, Bashar Assad issued a dual warning – to Europeans, and to Syrians hoping for European help; speaking to journalist Hamdi Kandil on Dubai Television, he said that he had warned Europeans not to interfere with internal Syrian affairs, and that any foreign embassy’s intervention on behalf of a Syrian prisoner would be considered as treason on part of the detainee.(21)

When Syria’s regional position had been strengthened again and Europe was willing to relaunch the negotiation process, Assad once again balked and refused. All hopes for an agreement evaporated with the start of the Syrian uprising, but such examples of European complacency unfortunately abound with regards to the Assad regime. It was blatantly obvious all along that Assad sought European funding while refusing to fundamentally reform economically (lest his crony network be affected) or politically, and that he would not become the kind of partner for whom the EU had created this Agreement.

2.2 Sanctions and Indecision

In 2011, the EU introduced sanctions against the Syrian regime in response to its violent repression of the civilian uprising(22). The sanctions targeted companies and business people associated with the regime, and included a ban on the import of oil; they restricted some investments and the export of equipment and technology to Syria; and they froze the assets of the Syrian Central Bank held in the EU. Official condemnations of the regime’s violence were also made regularly, but little else was attempted to rein in Assad, his army, and his growing militias.

The EU’s lukewarm decisions were also weighed down by divergences from within about the way to tackle Assad, with some member states less eager to take a strong position against the regime. Britain, France, The Netherlands and Germany’s strong initial stances were countered by the reluctance of countries like Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic (the latter, unlike the rest of the EU members, having never even closed its embassy in Damascus). Those differences remain today, with growing calls for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Assad coming from the same group.

While exercising only the mildest of pressures on the Assad regime that had no chance of effecting real change, the EU gave no concrete help to the political opposition which was beginning to look for consensus on major policy lines, and for support from powerful democratic countries. It was always understood by all that a military European involvement was never an option; moreover, even serious political support to a coalition of Syrian opposition groups was hindered by a European and international insistence for the opposition to be unanimous and comprehensive. Unlike other oppositions around the world, Syrians were not given the right to disagree amongst themselves, and they were told in no uncertain terms that they would be given no substantial support until they reached a harmonious agreement amongst themselves on practically everything. This wasted valuable time while Assad was struggling militarily, giving him indirect reassurance that the opposition could not yet be a threat to his hegemony.

Europe also did not attempt to seriously pressure other countries supporting the Assad regime. In fact, the opposite occurred in the case of Iran, with which several nations were negotiating a nuclear deal at any price. The latter, in effect, came at the heaviest of costs to Syrians who experienced the brunt of the regime’s growing dependence on a flow of Iranian material, financial and military aid – all unhindered in the slightest by the nuclear deal. On the contrary, it was precisely because of the nuclear deal that Iran was able to spread its wings and encroach its influence on Syria further.

Despite its formidable power as an institution, or as the sum of its various parts, the EU demonstrated complete immobility when Assad and his allies started committing the greatest war crimes this century has seen. The world condemned but watched, immobile, the mass slaughter of civilians such as the one in Houla(23), chemical massacres(24), the sieges of Ghouta(25), Aleppo(26) and other cities, massive bombing campaigns with the infamous barrel bombs(27), the launch of Scud missiles on civilian areas(28), demographic engineering(29), forced displacement, torture of civilians on an industrial scale(30), the specific targeting of schools, hospitals(31) and markets, and the destruction of all buildings and infrastructure which could benefit any Syrian who had chosen to rise up against Assad.(32)

This European passivity was not an inadvertent result of influential nations having their hands tied, nor the unfortunate consequence of blockages at the Security Council: it was deliberately chosen as a constant course of inaction. From the beginning, there was a concerted European effort to be part of a broad international consensus - namely the large Friends of Syria group(33) - while simultaneously ensuring that the baton was passed to the US to take the lead on Syria.

When the Obama administration refused to budge on tangible support for the opposition (delivering night-vision goggles, for example, which could have no impact on the barrel bombs falling from Assad’s helicopters), and when President Obama took the easy way out in response to the first large scale chemical massacre in Ghouta despite his “red line” warning(34), the EU was more than happy to follow suit, paying lip service to this alleged incapacity to do more.

2.3 The Russia Factor

With Russia’s military entrance into the Syrian conflict in 2015, alleging it was fighting ISIS while in fact only bombing opposition and civilian areas(35) (leaving the targeting of ISIS in Raqqa mostly to the US-led coalition), the EU continued its retreat into irrelevance on the Syrian scene, despite a simultaneous upsurge in refugees seeking asylum in its midst, later causing great political tumult within the Union and in different states.

Of course, this European paralysis was not limited to Syria. In the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, the EU could have also taken a much stronger position and demonstrated its might as an institution, but it was quickly made clear to Russia that it had very little to fear in terms of real retaliation. Unlike the more limited consequences on the EU of allowing Ukraine to fall prey to the Russian push for greater influence, events in Syria, in contrast, had a real and tangible effect on European Union member states. But with its own troubling developments, experiencing a rise in populist movements, a retreat of the US from international forums, and an unprecedented refugee crisis, and faced with the sudden reality of Brexit (itself at least partly influenced by the refugee crisis), the EU seemed to lose its common political direction as it became overwhelmed with domestic politics and policies in terms of migration, security, and integration.

2.4 European Aid to Syria

With Syria, the EU has focused its approach on humanitarian aid. Since 2011, it has thus far distributed approximately 20 billion euros to Syrians, with a further 4.9 billion pledged for 2020 and beyond, through aid organizations and local civil society organizations.(36) However, this massive amount has neither fixed real problems nor alleviated the suffering of Syrians. Without serious political pressure to contain Assad and his allies’ military onslaught, no amount of aid could have protected the intended beneficiaries, especially as the regime has secured – through Russian vetoes at the Security Council – a monopoly on deliveries through limited border controls.(37)

At the same time, since the beginning of the uprising, the EU has rightly continued to provide financial and logistical support for numerous Syrian civil society organizations, investing in capacity-building and awareness-raising on democratization, accountability, justice, and citizenship. Just like with humanitarian aid, however, this important investment in the future of Syrians will become meaningless and have been for nothing if the recipients are unable to apply what they have learned, and if their only lesson from the EU is “do as we say, not as we do.”

3 After-Effects of Inaction

As the Syrian revolution approaches the tenth anniversary of its ignition, after an ebb and flow of control on various parts of the country by opposition forces (the military resistance having been formed by defected soldiers who refused to obey orders to shoot to kill, joined gradually by civilians who took up arms to join them in the Free Syrian Army), the Assad regime has been able to recapture large areas of Syria with the support of solid allies who had assured it of a military victory. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, Assad and Russia still need to live with the presence of US troops in the northeast, and that of Turkish troops in the north of the country.

3.1 Military Victory

With the majority of attacks having come from the air, whether from helicopters or fighter jets, the Syrian rebels’ initial victories were inevitably overturned without the capacity to neutralize Assad’s planes. Neither the adequate armaments (namely MANPADS), nor the no-fly-zone for which most of the Syrian opposition at large and civil society so forcefully pleaded, were ever delivered or even seriously considered.

Still, without the actual support of Iran (on the ground) and Russia (in the air), Assad had been unable to retake a single village from the poorly armed rebels. This military victory, therefore, is not Assad’s, nor the Syrian army’s, which itself gradually took a less prominent role while Iran-backed militias (most powerful of which being Hezbollah), under the strategic direction of Qasem Soleimani until his assassination in 2020, with the Russian air force doing the heavy lifting. As for Assad’s army and militias, they were in full control of the arrest, imprisonment, and torture of tens of thousands of Syrians, as graphically documented by the Caesar photos smuggled out of Syria.(38)

This is a crucial point to consider as Europe begins to plan for post-war scenarios; if no accountability ensues for these war criminals, a state of peace and effective Syrian conviviality will be impossible to achieve – especially when Assad, by himself, has proved incapable of holding his ground without serious help, and will again resort to heavy violence at any sign of protest.

3.2 Economic Dire Straits

Even with this military victory for Assad, nothing else is improving for the regime. In fact, the situation of all Syrians has worsened exponentially, with military advances proving inconsequential for the economy. Sanctions are only a small part of the equation, however, and a sanctions relief decision would be unlikely to greatly alleviate the suffering of Syrians. As has been seen repeatedly, every injection of help meant for needy Syrians is confiscated by Assad to prioritize his militias, warlords and cronies, leaving nothing to trickle down for the population.

The financial liberties taken by the regime, as proven once more by recent domestic developments, show that Assad turns against his even closest allies and family when needed, to ascertain his own rule. Assad’s very public disempowerment of his cousin Rami Makhlouf, until then the Assad regime’s portfolio manager, is just the latest example. Sanctions relief without strings attached will not reach those who need it the most.

In addition, through the vetoes of his allies on the Security Council, Assad has also ensured that international aid comes only through borders he controls.(39) This allows him to distribute the aid according to the alliances that suit him, ensuring the people he needs are profiteering to their satisfaction, and completely neglecting the issue of where the aid is actually most needed.

The overall effect of these combined factors has led Syrians in regime-controlled areas – even Syrians the regime likes to portray as active supporters – to experience the most drastic circumstances since the beginning of the war. Social media networks have been flooded in recent weeks by photos posted by Syrians in Damascus, Homs and other major cities in Syria under regime control, showing huge lines in front of bakeries, or even videos showing Syrians having to run after the bread delivery truck, and often going back home empty handed to hungry children. At the same time, massive lines of cars have been shown waiting in line entire days to fill their gas tanks, all over the country.(40)

While average Syrians are struggling to get by, rich ones affiliated to the regime are continuing to enjoy their crony capitalist privileges. EmmaTel (the newest Syrian telecommunications company after Rami Makhlouf was stripped of his Syriatel monopoly) has boasted on its own social media pages of being the first company – and Syria being the first country – to sell the iPhone12, Apple’s latest offering which itself had only been launched ten days before it could be found in Damascus.(41)

These are not the actions of a regime with any intention of securing its remaining citizens’ livelihood with EU aid.

3.3 Refugees Without Refuge

Perhaps the Syrian issue which most resonates in Europe is that of refugees, considered to be an unbearable burden for the continent. After an initial welcome in 2015, especially in Germany which declared it would accept 1 million refugees(42), the welcome has dampened in some places and has been completely withdrawn in others. Some political parties in various states (such as the far-right AfD party in Germany, and the People’s Party in Denmark) have even begun to run political campaigns to return Syrian refugees to their country of origin, claiming the war is over and it would be safe for them there.(43)

A return for most refugees is still not safe, even with the end of the air bombing campaigns in most of Syria. Until today, citizens are being harassed, intimidated, threatened and imprisoned for the slightest deviation from the total obedience and silence demanded from the regime.

Sadly, and ironically, these refugees find themselves unwanted not only in the countries where they sought refuge, but also in their country of origin. Even those desperate enough to return to an unsustainable position in Syria are discouraged through various means by the regime, the most recent one being the de facto entry tax (equaling some $100) for merely crossing the border.(44)

Even if they do make it across, there is almost certainly nowhere for a Syrian refugee to go, except perhaps to the already distressed governorate of Idlib. In every area retaken by the Assad regime, homes which were not destroyed have been reallocated in a massive demographic engineering exercise, guided by Iran. The regime has confiscated countless Syrian properties and grabbed a large amount of land parcels, to which refugees could not return even if the situation were as simplistically safe as some parties have been describing.

By striking a deal with Turkey to rein in would-be refugees from seeking refuge in Europe, the European Union has not only reneged its own humanitarian principles, but it has put Syrian refugees – and to a certain degree the EU itself – in the untenable position of being pawns on President Erdogan’s chess board.(45)

In the meantime, the bulk of the Syrian refugee population is left to its own devices, stuck in dire straits around the Middle East with no prospects for the future, not feeling welcome anywhere. Whether in formal camps or informal dwellings, refugees are experiencing rampant illiteracy, child marriages, idleness, and frustration, all of which tend to lead to a retreat into more fundamentalist mindsets – a dangerous slope for Syrians and for Europeans alike.

This is the lost generation of Syria, and it will multiply exponentially if no measures are taken to change the path refugees are treading against their collective will.

3.4 Doomed Opposition

In the midst of these circumstances that, for the most part, are outside of Syrian control, the Syrian people have also been failed by the dismal performance of the opposition at large, now gathered in a broad National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. While its creation and initial achievements had been supported by a significant portion of Syrians, especially during official negotiations following the 2013 chemical massacre in Ghouta, the Coalition has slipped into insignificance despite the sub-groups that have been created specifically to negotiate.

When global and European tacit support began to weaken for Syrian revolutionaries, various factions of the opposition found themselves relying solely on the support of various undemocratic sponsors who dictate the broad lines their protégés must take. Today, some answer to Ankara, others to Riyadh, some to Moscow, and all are criticized by a large portion of Syrians who feel they have become spokespeople of the respective governments supporting them, rather than spokespeople for the opposition at large and for the Syrian people still awaiting deliverance from their despair.

The opposition is also strongly criticized for having failed to engage the international community, to make its case rationally and succinctly in the world’s influential capitals and media, and to explain the essence of the conflict in Syria to European and global audiences. Instead, Syrians watched dismayed as numerous opposition figures bickered amongst themselves on social media and on Arabic language channels.

The revolution’s chants for the downfall of the regime were always meant by Syrians to be understood as demands for the downfall of an entire system, and not an exchange from one system to another similar one. There has been much Syrian criticism of the opposition’s recent “musical chairs” games, where the leader of the Coalition and the leader of the High Negotiations Committee simply traded places in the last elections, in a Putin-Medvedev manner.(46) The fact that the top ladders of the Coalition did not even consider how this would be perceived by the Syrians they supposedly represent spoke volumes to Syrians around the world. Instead of leading by example, many opposition members have merely demonstrated that their attachment to “the chair” (a Syrian euphemism for power) differed little from that of the regime.

It is still impossible for Syrians to elect their representatives or their opposition, but it is doubtful they would choose many from the formal self-formed opposition to represent them one day, after their spectacular failures in upholding the very values demanded by the popular civilian uprising.

These issues have left most Syrians bitter and disillusioned, feeling let down by their own recognized opposition, let down by superpowers preaching but not enabling human rights and democracy, and let down by a region which has continuously mistreated them.

4 Engagement Delusions

Despite all the numerous negative consequences of regime actions and global inaction, formal rhetoric from leading global powers now only alludes to changes in regime behavior – a significant regression even though regime change was never really on the table.

The current narrative speaks of regime victory and survival as a fait accompli, reverting the entire issue of Syrians into one of refugees who must be returned to a “safe” country despite all evidence to the contrary.

Arguments have also been made about the inability of Assad to rebuild destroyed areas of Syria while sanctions remain. However, there is no sign that Assad ever had the intention in the first place of rebuilding the areas he and his allies destroyed. In fact, regime loyalists have never hidden the fact that a smaller population is easier to manage in terms of obedience, especially one which has been already subdued from sheer exhaustion, with nowhere else to go.

Arguments for engagement “for the sake of Syrians” (heard increasingly in Europe and in the US) are a consequence of an erroneous reading of developments. The war is not over while Idlib looms large on the resolution of the conflict. Nearly 200,000 innocent civilians and prisoners of conscience remain in the custody of the regime,(47) their location and fate unbeknownst to their loved ones; despite the regime’s obligation to liberate them to comply with Security Council Resolution 2254, and despite repeated requests by the United Nations Special Envoy Geir Pedersen, Assad is refusing to budge on this matter which would cost him nothing.

Refugees are not going back to Syria even if they wished they could go back, prohibited not only by the cost of this new virtual entrance visa, but also by the terrifying prospects awaiting those who return, rightly fearing continued repression – or even death – from the regime.(48) Those who still manage to go back, despite all odds, find themselves abandoned to their own devices, with their homes either destroyed, confiscated or unattainable with no deeds to prove ownership.

Russia (and Iran) are in Syria for the long haul. President Putin has achieved his military goals, but he is struggling to contain the conflict and to get a return on his investment. He needs an out that saves face and solves several problems at once. Signs of Russian impatience with Assad have been appearing more frequently this year, with Russian media beginning to openly criticize Assad’s incompetence in resolving governmental issues.(49) In October, Putin even withheld wheat shipments to Syria to pressure Assad to engage in the constitutional committee, causing an immediate shortage of bread in the country.(50)

Following recommendations for re-engagement, therefore, would merely guarantee that Russia, Iran and of course Assad can be relieved of the burdens and difficulties of appeasing the population’s anger and frustration, while the crony system continues to enrich itself at the expense of everyone.

In the long run, such a re-engagement would be a precursor for an endless flow of refugees, for rampant illiteracy, for child marriages and population explosion, and for radicalism, extremism, and possibly jihadism. Long-term, the current problem will be compounded and out of control.

It would also enable the Assad regime to continue being a major impediment to solutions in the region, especially in Lebanon whose fate is tied to that of the Syrian regime (through Hezbollah).

Thus far, appeasement has benefitted no one but Assad, personally responsible for the greatest humanitarian catastrophe of the 21st century. His actions have also allowed populist and autocratic leaders with delusions of grandeur (in Turkey and Russia, amongst others), to enlarge their playing field with no real risk of repercussions, turning them into actual players able to impose their own agendas on a self-weakened EU.

5 Defining Parameters for a Syrian Transition

5.1 Loyalists and Oppositionists?

Some European proponents of engagement with Assad claim that a majority of Syrians did not turn against the Assad regime and continue to support it, in all regime-held areas. And just as they undercount the number of Syrians killed, they also underestimate the number of Syrians who have fled their homes (at least 7 million internally displaced people) and their country (well over 6 million). These already count for a simple majority, at the very least.

It is also a major mistake – or, for some, a deliberate deception – to count Syrians under regime control as “pro-Assad.” Syrians are under no illusion that the space for even the slightest dissent has vanished; nevertheless, discontent remains rife and most people are realizing that the end of the war does not equate an improvement in their lives. The open demonstrations in Suweida this year,(51) and others on the Syrian coast in areas considered to be regime strongholds, have shown that even Syrians who remained silent for years are now speaking out.

It is not through a calculation of territory won and controlled by Assad, but rather through a calculation of the number of people who would give their open opinions – if they could – that the balance of loyalists and oppositionists can be calculated. The clear majority of Syrians remains outside Assad’s control, and the Syrians under his control are far from being all loyalists.

This means that at the very least, a majority (if not an overwhelming majority) of Syrians would actively support a political transition to move forward, with very few segments of the population still willing to fight for Assad (the militias, warlords, cronies).

Besides, if Europe were to follow its own laws on human rights and accountability, the possibility of engaging with the Assad regime after its massive crimes would not even be an issue to consider, regardless of how many people still support him.

5.2 Alternative Actors

For years, the Assad regime and supporters spreading disinformation have used the tired narrative that it was either Assad or the extremists. This equation continues to be used as an excuse to do nothing, despite the many examples of civil society and opposition at large initiatives which prove there has always been a third option. This is not to say that there is a custom-made team ready to take over; rather, it means that the wishes of a majority of Syrians can be granted in a pluralistic, participatory democratic exercise.

Today, new local leaderships have emerged. After years of exercising their newly-found capacity for civic duties, with networks of civil society groups spanning Syria, the region and most of the Western world, many Syrians combine knowledge with a strong aspiration to be part of their country’s future. Together, they form a formidable base with a wealth of expertise and have founded a grassroots force which can contribute to the rebuilding of Syria – physically and otherwise.

5.3 EU Options

While the notion of European involvement on a military level was never on the table, there are still many avenues for the EU to take its rightful place as a leading actor on Syria, and to protect its interests. For this, it can use diplomatic, legal, and financial tools, in partnership with Syrians in Europe who should be seen as assets and partners – not just burdens – and who can make a big contribution to the long-term resolution of the conflict.

There is an opportunity to restore the agency of Syrians already within the EU, by giving them a role in the rebuilding of their communities and in the future of their country of birth. Even if all do not choose to return after having made a new life in Europe, they nearly all have extended families and social networks to support, and a shared traumatic need to do something – as demonstrated over the years by the huge efforts and the countless civil society organizations Syrians have mounted and led for nearly 10 years. They should be working together with EU policy makers.

The EU can also play a crucial role in supporting new opposition voices, so that they do not feel obligated or pressured to toe the line of the non-democratic governments backing the established political opposition. Only a Western democracy can truly support and uplift the numerous qualified Syrians who can make qualitative contributions to the political transition of their country, and to its rebuilding.

Of course, refugees are one of the Syrian regime’s (and Russia’s) major cards. They know how desperately most countries are to get rid of them, and therefore dangle the notion of return and normality only if the West would agree to lift sanctions. But the regime will not rebuild areas it has destroyed; rather, it is building gigantic luxury real estate projects on illegally grabbed lands(52) (with most inhabitable areas having already been demographically engineered with Iran’s help). Forcibly sending back refugees to unsafe areas would only cause greater chaos in the region – chaos which would affect Europe as well.

By continuing to focus only on the symptoms and not daring to tackle the root cause of the Syrian crisis which has become a European problem, the EU would be condemning itself to years of heightened tensions, of refugee waves, and of increased insecurity on its collective borders. It is time to choose another path which will benefit Syrians and benefit the EU.

Assad is holding the Syrian population hostage, waiting for the democratic world to take pity on the suffering people in areas he controls and to remove sanctions so he can pretend to help them. But Assad is not interested in a functioning society; he is more than happy with barely surviving communities that are too afraid to demand more than the bare minimum any longer, thus keeping people in check while the avid elite gets its fill.

Syria can therefore not survive as a viable entity, nor contribute to the stabilization of the eastern Mediterranean, while the Assad regime is still in place.

6 Recommendations

The EU should consider effecting the following major recommendations on Syria, under several umbrellas: firstly, a new people approach; secondly, a joint economic and educational incentive; thirdly, a push for a judicial process; fourthly, a realistic political development with Russia; and, lastly, a realignment of global alliances with regard to Syria.

1 Connect Opposition and Civil Society Efforts in Europe and Around Syria

The EU should support a new selection of independent opposition figures, including those within the Syrian diaspora throughout Europe (in opposition at large and in civil society), who can become new leaders and create a strong link between the EU and Syria. They will build new bridges of trust, contribute to the formation of Syrians in and around Syria, and rekindle civil society’s faith in the possibility for a new beginning back home.

It is partly because of sustained support and organization that religious-leaning groups managed to get ahead in the Syrian revolution – financially, politically and militarily. By seriously helping secular Syrians do the same outside the military realm and without the restrictions of being supported by regional undemocratic regimes, the EU would effect a real change in both dynamics and narratives about the transition - a transition mandated by Security Council Resolution 2254(53). It is in the interest of Europe, and of the future Syria, that the religious and sectarian groups which have infiltrated many opposition alliances – and regime ones for that matter – be weakened, through the rise of strong, independent, secular political forces.

2 Set New Economic and Educational Roots

The EU should reconsider the overall effect of its aid packages, and it must rethink the usefulness of scattered grants that limit themselves to broad advocacy on democratization issues. Instead, it should start investing in targeted education and vocational training programs that are interlinked to family schemes, aiming to help communities achieve self-sustainment on a longer term. This would ensure that while parents (women and men) are receiving formal training in useful skills which will be needed to rebuild the country, children are being educated with a new curriculum merging a national base with international citizenship concepts. The curricula should be prepared in coordination and consultation with independent Syrian figures and civil society in the region and in the diaspora, including those in Europe, to ensure no agenda (political, religious, or ethnic) can influence the educational approach.

These hubs of education and vocational training must be built in areas which are off-limits to Assad, and the EU can and must use its formidable political and economic clout to impose guarantees of non-interference from Russia and Turkey. Even without a no-fly-zone and even without an armed presence or boots on the ground, the EU would be contributing to the stabilization and reconstruction of parts of Syria that are out of Assad’s control in a physical and abstract sense, building a model which can be replicated elsewhere in the country when the transition happens.

In particular, the EU should aim at spreading actionable secular citizenship and gender policies in deeds and not just words. Such EU schemes should give women vocational training that goes beyond the typical ones currently given (sewing, soap making, baking, etc.). It should also begin to educate girls and young women in skills generally dominated by men in conservative societies, to actively contribute to their own sustainability and to their country’s economic development. To change the mindset of the next generation, women must also be trained in business and commercial skills, languages, program management, and traditional professional fields such as medicine, engineering, or architecture.

After the establishment of these new hubs, the EU should offer incentives to asylum seekers and refugees to return to their country and move to these new sustainable areas, offering jobs to those who commit to these programs.

To effect a drastic change in outlook for the future, and to satisfy the needs and demands of a vast majority of Syrian civil society over the last decade, the EU should do everything in its power to move away from concepts of “minorities” and “majorities” – in religious, sectarian, ethnic, and national terms. It should embrace actionable programs and language that promotes a more profound but demonstrably more equitable concept of democracy, citizenry, and secularism. These are necessary concepts which have their place in Syrian society at this stage of the conflict.

3 Advance the Accountability Processes for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

The EU should give strong and full-blown support to human rights and war crimes trials in the respective European jurisdictions where legislation allows for this. It must expedite legal support for the trials of war criminals, and of people guilty of sanctions evasion, to follow on the declared EU policy to pursue justice and accountability for Syria.

This is one of the developments which have given Syrians the most hope that some closure could be reached in Syria (with the trials in Germany, and the recent decision by the Dutch government to sue the Assad regime). These trials are reinstating Syrian confidence in European values, a needed development for a smooth recalibration of the EU’s role in Syria’s future and for its relations with its own refugees.

4 Apply Tangible Political Pressure to Achieve Transition

Russia, Assad’s greatest asset on the international arena, is in serious need of things, which the European Union has in abundance, namely money and resources, both key to resolving his Syria quagmire. Putin’s goal was never the survival of Assad per se, as many observers erroneously say: Putin’s objective was the establishment of solid Russian military, economic and political influence in Syria and the region. Assad was the means, not the end. While Putin has achieved this goal, he is now stuck with a big Assad problem, a problem so thorny Russia has had to appoint four Syria envoys to deal with various files.(54) Putin is also pushing for the return of refugees to Syria, assuming this would nudge Europe towards financing and rebuilding what Russia’s air force, Iran’s militias and Assad’s army have decimated.

Putin must be persuaded to enforce the political transition mandated by Security Council Resolution 2254, which will not threaten his interests in the least. Therefore, the EU should apply serious political pressure directly to Russia regarding the facilitation of the only items currently being discussed under the resolution: the constitutional committee, the ensuing referendum, and elections under international supervision. There are enough big projects in the pipeline between Russia and the EU for the latter to attach some strings to agreements with Russia; the North Stream II project is one such area of possible negotiation, where Putin could be convinced to give concessions in Syria which relate to the EU’s security interests.

5 Lead the Drive to Regain International Consensus on Syria

As Syrians gloomily observe the 50th anniversary of the Assad coup, and the 10th anniversary of a revolution which the regime turned into a bloody conflict, the US is transitioning from years of international uncertainty under President Trump to an expected era of more familiar diplomacy under President Biden.

The change will be felt not only in style, but also in policy on important issues such as Syria. In an encouraging comment, Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris said that the Biden administration “will once again stand with civil society and pro-democracy partners in Syria, and help advance a political settlement where the Syrian people have a voice.”(55)

A big Syria-related change will occur in the declared decision of President-Elect Biden, already working with a team that has driven policy during the Obama administration, to rejoin the JCPOA (the Iran nuclear deal) within months of his taking office.(56) This is music to the Iranian regime’s ears, and to most EU countries, still believing that engagement of this scale with Tehran reaps benefits. But the EU would be damaging its own interests if it does not take this opportunity to advise the US to take a more forceful approach towards the Iranian regime’s continued interference in Syria (and in Lebanon), not only through the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019(57) but with determined and consistent political pressure.

Reining in Iran in the Syrian context would not be opposed by Russia, which itself will have its own recalibration issues with the US following the turbulent past few years. A joint US-EU position on both Russia’s and Iran’s involvement in Syria would lead to much more workable solutions in the different courses of action advocated in this paper.

The EU can and should lead its allies into learning the right lessons from having allowed Assad to escalate an uprising into a conflict, generating so much bloodshed, destruction, and repercussions far beyond the confines of Syria. The EU must be proactive and take control of the foreign policy decisions which affect its security.

To avoid another 50 years of regional Assad-led chaos, renewed engagement for and with Syrians – but certainly not with the Assad regime – will benefit those who have suffered the tragic consequences of this laisser-faire, leading to a new understanding and modus vivendi between the EU and some of its Mediterranean neighbors.

About the Author: Rime Allaf is a Syrian-born writer, editor, and public speaker. A former Associate Fellow at London’s Chatham House for nearly ten years, she has researched, spoken and written about Syria, the region and international affairs. On Syria, she focuses on domestic, geopolitical, cultural and socio-economic affairs. She has written and spoken extensively about the country in the decade preceding the revolution of 2011, and in the decade since then. She is a Board Member of the Syrian civil society organization The Day After. She is also on the Advisory Council of the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program.

Endnotes

1. See, “Profile: Syria’s Ruling Baath Party”, BBC, July 9, 2012.

2. See Francis X. Clines, “Britain Breaks Syrian Ties; Cites Proof of Terror Role; El Al Suspect is Convicted; US Recalls Envoy”, New York Times, October 25, 1986.

3. See Deborah Amos, “30 Years Later, Photos Emerge from Killings in Syria”, NPR, February 2, 2012.

4. See Andrew Glass, “George H.W. Bush Creates Coalition to Liberate Kuwait”, Politico, August 7, 1990.

5. See “A wasted decade; Human rights in Syria during Bashar al-Assad’s first ten years in power”, Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2010.

6. See Alex Shone, “A low hanging fruit: Engagement with Syria and its role in the Middle East”, Defence Viewpoints, 25 November, 2010.

7. See “Fact Sheet: Implementing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003”, The White House Press Release, May 11, 2004.

8. See Brian Whitaker, “By unpopular demand; Syria increased its international alienation by pushing Lebanon into extending Emile Lahoud's presidential term”, The Guardian, September 6, 2004.

9. See “Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There”, United Nations, September 9, 2004.

10. See Robert G. Rabil, “Syria’s Regime Writes its Future in the Sand”, The Daily Star, May 24, 2006.

11. See, “Hezbollah Takes Over West Beirut”, BBC, May 9, 2008.

12. See Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, “Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah Stronger”, New York Times, May 22, 2008. 13 See “Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad”, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011.

14. See Jamie Tarabay, “For Many Syrians, the Story of the War Began with Graffiti in Dara’a”, CNN, March 15, 2018.

15. See John Hudson, “U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000”, Foreign Policy, April 22, 2016.

16. See “Syrian Revolution Nine Years On: 586,100 Persons Killed and Millions of Syrians Displaced and Injured”, The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, March 15, 2020.

17. At least 580,000 people have been killed in Syria since March 2011. See “16 UNSC vetoes blocking action and accountability”, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 15, 2020.

18. See Ben Hubbard, “Syria Seeks Return of Refugees, but They Fear Leader’s Wrath”, New York Times, November 12, 2020.

19. See the European Council’s “Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on the Refugee Conference in Damascus”, November 10, 2020.

20. See Andrew Rettman, “EU Clears Way for New Treaty with Syria”, EU Observer, October 8, 2009.

21. See “Hamdi Kandil’s interview with Bashar Assad” (الرئيس بشار الأسد مع حمدي قنديل ), Dubai TV, August 23, 2006.

22. See the European Union’s “Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011, concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/273/CFSP”.

23. See “Houla Massacre: UN Blames Syria Troops and Militia”, BBC, August 15, 2012.

24. See Joby Warrick, “More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says”, Washington Post, August 30, 2013.

25. See United Nations’ report, “Syria’s Siege of Eastern Ghouta ‘Barbaric and Medieval‘ Says UN Commission of Inquiry”, June 20, 2018.

26. See Lyse Doucet, “Aleppo Siege: 'We Are Crying and Afraid'”, BBC, December 3, 2016.

27. See, Kenneth Roth, “To Stem the Flow of Syrian Refugees, Stop the Barrel Bombs”, Human Rights Watch, September 23, 2015.

28. See Spencer Ackerman. “Syria Fires Scud Missiles, Burning Bombs and Even Sea Mines at Rebels”, Wired, December 12, 2012.

29. See David Gardner, “Syria is Witnessing a Violent Demographic Re-Engineering”, Financial Times, October 2, 2019.

30. See Anne Barnard, “Inside Syria’s Secret Torture Prisons: How Bashar al-Assad Crushed Dissent”, New York Times, May 11, 2019.

31. See Malachy Browne et al, “Hospitals and Schools Are Being Bombed in Syria. A U.N. Inquiry Is Limited. We Took a Deeper Look”, New York Times, December 31, 2019.

32. See Ben Taub, “The Assad Files: Capturing the Top-Secret Documents That Tie the Syrian Regime to Mass Torture and Killings”, The New Yorker, April 18, 2016.

33. See Marc Daou, “Friends of Syria Push for Tougher Sanctions”, France 24, July 6, 2012.

34. See Romain Houeix, “A History of the Syria Chemical Weapons ‚Red Line‘”, France 24, April 14, 2018.

35. See Helene Cooper et al, “Russians Strike Targets in Syria, but Not ISIS Areas”, New York Times, September 30, 2015.

36. See “Syrian Crisis: EU Mobilizes an Overall Pledge of €6.9 Billion for 2020 and Beyond”, European Commission, June 30, 2020.

37. See Edith M. Lederer, “Russia and China Veto Cross-Border Aid to Syria’s Northwest”, Associated Press, July 8, 2020.

38. See the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights’ report, “Caesar Photos Document Systematic Torture”.

39. See “UN Restarts Syria Cross-Border Aid But With Only One Access Point”, The Guardian, July 12, 2020.

40. See Ben Hubbard, “Syria’s Economy Collapses Even as Civil War Winds to a Close”, New York Times, June 15, 2020.

41. See Emmatel’s Facebook announcement on the “Launch of the iPhone12 in Damascus”, 23 October, 2020.

42. See Luke Harding, “Angela Merkel Defends Germany's Handling of Refugee Influx”, The Guardian, September 15, 2015.

43. See “Denmark’s Government at Risk in Row With Nationalists Over Syrian Refugees”, Reuters, December 12, 2017.

44. See Sara Kayyali, “Syria’s 100 Dollar Barrier to Return”, Human Rights Watch, September 23, 2020.

45. See “Migrant Crisis: EU-Turkey Deal Comes Into Effect”, BBC. March 20, 2016.

46. See “Internal Strife, Accusations of Cronyism Amid Syrian National Coalition Elections”, North Press Agency, July 16, 2020.

47. See Katarina Montgomery, “Assessing the State of Syria’s Detainees”, The New Humanitarian, June 6, 2014.

48. See “Returning Syrian Refugees Face Death and Disappearance”, The New Arab, November 7, 2018.

49. See “Russia’s Media Campaign Against Al-Assad Regime: Causes and Consequences”, Emirates Policy Center, April 30, 2020.

50. See Bethan McKernan and Ahmad Haj Hamdo, “Syria Introduces Limits on Subsidized Bread as Economic Crisis Bites”, The Guardian, October 5, 2020.

51. See Sarah Dadouch, “Syrian Protesters Raise Rare Anti-Assad Chants Amid Economic Plunge”, Washington Post, June 11, 2020.

52. See Zeina Karam, “A Luxury City Shows Blueprint for Syria’s Rebuilding Plans”, Associated Press, November 5, 2018.

53. See the United Nations’ Resolution, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for Peace Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks”, December 18, 2015.

54. See “Four Russian Envoys to Syria: Kinshak as a Special Envoy for …”, Al Khaleej Times, October 2020.

55. See “Kamala Harris: US Will Reverse Trump-Era Policy, Restore Relation with Palestine”, Middle East Monitor, November 3, 2020.

56. See Katrina Manson and Michael Peel, “Biden Team Considers Options on Iran Nuclear Deal”, Financial Times, November 10, 2020.

57. See the U.S. Department of State’s fact sheet on the “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”, June 17, 2020.