Qatar's influence increases in the Middle East
Rime Allaf, December 15, 2011
Foresight and an open mind are paying off for Syria's newest enemy, as the wealthy state's political capital in the region grows
Syrian media have been busy since the uprising, weaving fantastic conspiracy theories, of open-air studios in secret locations where fake demonstrations are filmed, of campaigns stemming from personal animosity and of dubious Islamist agendas – all emanating from a single source. The proof, we are always told, is in the USB stick waved at the camera by various regime spokespeople promising to reveal, one day, compromising information involving a number of Gulf potentates.
Apparently, the emir of Qatar and his al-Jazeera network are the biggest culprits, sowing chaos as part of a Gulf/Zionist/imperialist agenda to destabilise Syria. Even the Arab League's attempt to rein in the Syrian regime's brutal repression of its people seems solely due to Sheikha Mozah's special relations with certain US officials, according to Syria's ambassador to Cairo. Just like Turkey, Qatar seems to have suddenly developed a hatred for all things Syrian.
Qatar, until recently, had been Bashar al-Assad's biggest Arab supporter, chaperoning Syria's regional re-emergence after a difficult post-Hariri exclusion period, and fostering a new alliance including Turkey, amicable to Iran, as a counter-balance to traditional powers.
Way before revolutionary fervour set it on fire, the Arab world experienced two sets of alliances. In the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its liberation by a multinational and Arab force, the region settled into a broad Pax Arabica under the aegis of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria; the triumvirate ended Lebanon's civil war and put it under Syrian hegemony, and tried to steer Palestinians away from their first intifada through a long-winded peace process.
September 11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq shuffled the cards, but the modus operandi had already changed in 2000 with the ascent of an inexperienced Assad to the republican throne, causing friction with older leaders and paving the way for a new Arab balance of power.
Israel's war on Lebanon in 2006 and the ensuing Lebanese political stalemate marked the emergence of Qatar as a power broker; sponsoring the Doha agreement, Qatar brought Syria back to the limelight it had missed. While Saudi Arabia's role never diminished, years of Saudi-Qatari rivalry turned into an alliance that allowed Qatar the lead it was coveting, commensurate to its wealth and clout.
Thus, while Riyadh took the overt lead during the Yemeni and Bahraini uprisings, keeping them within the Gulf Co-operation Council, it was happy to leave Qatar to play the primary role in the Syrian revolution and in pushing the case to the Arab League.
Sarcastic comments about the league's sudden discovery of its own potential, and of its sudden selective support for democratic aspirations are moot. Obviously, it continues to be a mere vehicle for the demands of the leading Arab actors, who only endow the institution with powers when they wish to impact the entire region.
While the Qatari approach to Syria is now representative of the majority of Arab states, there is no doubt that personal animosity increased following the outrageous Syrian attacks on the emir and his wife. Al-Jazeera continues to broadcast revolutionary Syrian clips documenting the repression, as do the other networks, but the editorial line is reminiscent of Saudi media's anger after Assad's indirect depiction of King Abdullah as a "half-man" in 2006.
The powerful al-Jazeera network has internationalised the Syrian uprising, as it did those in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and just as it did when Lebanon and Gaza were under Israeli attack. Additionally, in its capacity as the oldest, and for a long time the only, pan-Arab television network, al-Jazeera has brought its owners an important fringe benefit not necessarily readily available to others: a capacity to connect with the major regional political forces, especially those making big waves in countries with recently deposed dictators.
Islamists, of course, have proved to be major players so far, and with influential clerics such as Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi theologising for years on al-Jazeera's screens, Qatar has since long had a direct channel to most Islamist parties in the region. Rather than imposing an Islamist agenda on the region, as some have accused it, Qatar is taking advantage of the clout it has built with them over the years to position itself as a leading interlocutor.
It is such incredible foresight that gives Qatar an edge other countries miss. Equally at ease with Islamist and secular parties, with liberals and conservatives, Qatar is reaping what it sowed and patiently nurtured years ago, giving it enough political capital on top of its formidable wealth to influence the region. To reword the obligatory cliché about its position, Qatar isn't punching above its weight but has become a heavyweight.
Even under its lead, however, the Arab League has shown tremendous reluctance in its decisions on Syria, letting repeated deadlines pass without acting on agreed sanctions. It is not foreign intervention that Qatar seeks, but on the contrary a regional solution that would stop the Syrian regime in its destructive tracks, for the Syrian people's sake, but also for that of the entire region.
