Syria, or the loneliness of the long-distance runner
Rime Allaf, September 2010 (Published in Spanish, link below)
When Bashar Assad came to power ten years ago, many were hoping, too prematurely, to see great changes happening within the country. The wave of expectations never had a chance to gather strength as events overtook the region and placed Syria in one of its most difficult positions since the 1980s: with September 11 triggering a succession of US-led demands and misadventures, an ideological fervor pushing foreign policy was able to flourish under the administration of George W. Bush, putting Syria at a disadvantage long before the infamous “axis of evil” nominations had been adopted by a completely obedient media.
The invasion of Iraq changed the political map of the Arab world, even though we have yet to see the dust settle and can expect many more years of regional chaos. For now, the new power lines and somewhat unintended consequences (unintended, albeit expected by many critics of the invasion) have ultimately benefited the very parties at the receiving end of US accusations. In spite of all the pressure which the US directs Syria’s way, and in spite of the multitude of American bases in the region, there is little doubt that developments in Iraq have weakened America, politically.
But Iraq has not been the only factor in Syria’s dramatic ups and downs in the last decade. While it is because of Iraq that Washington got Damascus in its sights, it is because of Lebanon that Syria was slapped with even more stifling American sanctions (even before the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri), and that its entire regional standing was shaken to its core.
It was difficult to imagine that Syria could overcome the political isolation and the denigration of its entire ruling class, especially as the new president had not yet made real allies outside of his immediate domestic circle. But in the course of the last ten years, Syria seems to have come full circle out of its predicament, even as the US struggles to find a coherent policy to adopt towards Damascus. And for all the changes that Syria experienced in this decade, much of its basic policies and behavior have remained unchanged.
The truth is that after a relatively calm change of the guards, and after numerous violent events and threats close to its own borders, Syria has managed to ultimately benefit from its own initial miscalculations, and, more importantly, from the mistakes of its detractors. Indeed, it is not so much what Syria did right, but what everyone else did wrong which allowed it to get back on track as if the last few years didn’t happen.
Non-negotiable continuity
At the death of Hafez Assad, the established modus operandi had been settled for years into a tripartite axis which consulted on the major issues of the region. The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria were in agreement over their respective roles, and their respective interests, making sure they didn’t step on each other’s toes. Coming into this solid network, the new Syrian leader received all the backing he initially needed. However, it was clear that his youth and relative inexperience pushed him into a different position than his father, in the perspective of his new peers; this issue was to play a role when major disagreements emerged between the countries over Lebanon, amongst others.
This distinction is important to the understanding of developments in Syria: while some friends and allies imagined they could be mentors or at least “elders” in the widest sense of the word, the new president immediately stepped into the shoes of Syria’s leader, and hence into the position of an equal. Thus, as the president of Syria, and as one of the three major Arab leaders, he expected to be treated according to his official rank, and not according to his personal background. It seems this was difficult to swallow for veterans like the president of Egypt, and for Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who subsequently became king and with whom relations tumbled to an all-time low for many reasons.
What everyone in the region and beyond did agree on at the time, however, was that the continuity of the Syrian regime served the purpose of all involved, and that chaos would benefit no one. In that respect, it was understandable to most that serious changes were not about to happen, just as they wouldn’t in other countries with the same predicament; Arab leaders, living in glass houses themselves, were not about to start throwing stones about democratization, of course, while outside powers also found what they knew to be infinitely better than the unknown.
Moreover, it was expected that a relatively similar foreign policy would continue to flow from Syria on the main isses, such as the conflict with Israel. While the basic foundations of Syrian policy have remained unchanged, and the long-term strategies are the same, there was certainly an unexpected difference in style, and in content, a difference that would be demonstrated most vividly in Lebanon.
The Lebanon file
Most agree that it was Syria’s involvement in Lebanon that made it so isolated and even ostracized after the precipitated withdrawal of its troops in April 2005, following Rafik Hariri’s assassination. Many observers have also been of the opinion that Syria’s recent exit from isolation, in contrast, was due to a number of new factors in the regional equation, the biggest one being Turkey. A careful reading of the situation surrounding these events, however, would show that it is actually because of Lebanon, and Israel’s attacks, that Syria, and Bashar Assad at its helm, are back in a position of strength in spite of everything.
From the advent of the Bush administration, Lebanon became Syria’s Achilles heel even while the world’s attention was focused on the aftermath of September 11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, and finally of Iraq. Even though Syria sat on the United Nations Security Council during the build-up to Iraq, and even though it surprisingly voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1441 of November 2002, which would later be used to justify the invasion of Iraq, the Bush team was not interested in a quid pro quo. Indeed, Bush expected cooperation from “lesser states” as a due, and not as part of an exchange, and the neocon White House was by default more royal than the king when it came to Israel’s opponents.
Signed in December 2003, with the sanctions launched in May 2004, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA) was the first major offensive act of the Bush administration against Syria. Others were to follow throughout the eight long Bush years, but this was the most damaging with its long-term validity, and wide reach.
Syria had been on the State Department’s list of “states sponsoring terror” since its 1979 support of the Islamic Revolution in Iran; nevertheless, this had not stopped diplomatic relations between the two countries, nor had it prohibited the continuous and direct dialogue ensuing from Syria’s participation in the liberation of Kuwait, in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, and the on-off peace negotiations with Israel over the next decade.
Bush changed everything and promptly distanced himself from his predecessor’s personal involvement in the Middle East. At the same time, Syria became more vocal and more active, in pursuit of its perceived interests, especially on the Palestinian and Arab cause, and on Lebanon. But in this rushed reconfiguration of parameters, the pragmatism which had for so long defined the very essence of Syrian policy (especially in Lebanon after the Taef Accord, which crowned the end of the civil war and the Syrian-Saudi era of cooperation) seemed to take second position while new rules were imposed on Lebanon.
One of the new president’s major changes in Lebanon was the removal of the long-time head of intelligence, Ghazi Kanan, and his replacement with Rustom Ghazale; immediately, the new envoy caused frictions with (and amongst) the established Lebanese leaders who had over the years reached a rather workable modus operandi with Kanan. The growing dissatisfaction in Lebanon was not given the attention it deserved.
While the situation deteriorated in Lebanon, the second biggest Syrian change took place, triggering a sequence of actions and counteractions which would lead to Syria’s exit from Lebanon. Indeed, by insisting on extending the term of incumbent Lebanese president Emile Lahoud, Syria ignored the urgent warnings from numerous parties about the consequences of this act. Nevertheless, when UNSC Resolution 1559 was passed, Syrian officials seemed genuinely surprised, especially as it was a resolution co-sponsored by France and the US, two countries which had clashed over Iraq, but which had now reconciled at the expense of Syria.
Syria’s hopes that French complaints about its interference in Lebanon would eventually diminish were dashed, as was the hope that the gamble on Lahoud would pay off. But the clout of Rafik Hariri, and his close relation with French President Jacques Chirac, had been underestimated by Syria. It was Hariri who was most slighted by the renewal of Lahoud’s term, especially as he had been forced to approve it in parliament just before he resigned. By insisting that Lahoud would be extended no matter what, Syria ensured the passing of UNSC resolution 1559.
This uncharacteristically unpragmatic move by Syria put the country in an unprecedented new political and legal quagmire: before Resolution 1559, and putting aside the resolutions prohibiting the export of Iraqi oil (which US allies Jordan and Turkey also blatantly disregarded), Syria had technically not been in breach of international law, and it wouldn’t be until the full withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon a few months later that Syria was clear again on that particular front.
Withdrawal
Without any doubt, the worst period in the presidency of Bashar Assad, and in Syria’s relations with most of its partners, happened between 2005 and 2006, when the entire world seemed to point the finger at his regime and accuse Syria of being responsible for every act of violence in Lebanon, beginning with the spectacular assassination of Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005. For the first time in the history of both countries, massive demonstrations all over Lebanon were held and insults hurled at the Syrians were watched on television sets the world over. Importantly, they were watched by stunned Syrians.
Caving in to Arab and to international pressure, Syria withdrew its remaining troops from Lebanon at the end of April and turned its attention to a number of urging domestic matters. While there was never a question at that time of the regime being unstable and in danger of falling, and certainly not because of Lebanese demonstrations or the withdrawal of the US ambassador, there nevertheless was no doubt that the regime was shaken to be on the receiving end of such a quasi-unanimous chorus of accusations.
Although the nationalist line was quickly adopted, with songs, rallies and articles hoping to whip up patriotic frenzy, the mood was edgy, and the president made serious promises to Syrians, in a speech at Damascus University in March 2005. Something was to be delivered, and rumours that the hated emergency law would be repelled started to surface, along with other political reforms, or rather adjustments. Of course, a regime under such pressure would never cave in politically, and it was clear that the changes would be of a different nature.
Indeed, change happened, in the form of a stunning economic reform presented at the Baath Party Congress in June. After decades, from one day to the next, the Syrian economy suddenly metamorphosed from a controlled closed socialist economy to a declared “social market economy.” The exact definition has yet to be given, but what mattered to Syrians, and to all domestic and foreign investors alike, was that the doors to imports were suddenly flung open.
This development was certainly aimed at appeasing Syrians as they faced ostracization from the world, but it was also aimed at punishing the Lebanese for having dared humiliate Syria in this manner. With an open Syrian economy, the Lebanese economy would suffer from the loss of a huge Syrian clientele which didn’t need to cross the border anymore for most of its needs.
Organized opposition
Some of Syria’s civil society activists paid dearly for their declared support for an equal relation between Syria and Lebanon; with the arrest and imprisonment of the Damascus-Beirut declaration signatories, one of the significant consequences of the Lebanese imbroglio, a nail was hammered in the coffin of any domestic opposition movement.
Outside Syria, however, a new opposition had formed with the most unsuited of actors. Former Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, a friend of Rafik Hariri, defected with a spectacular interview given to the Saudi news channel Al Arabiya on December 30, 2005; his main partner became the head of the Muslim Brothers, outlawed in Syria since the 1980s (mere membership in the party still carries the death penalty). A National Front was formed with a few minor Kurdish and Arab secular movements, but in effect these two so-called threats to the regime merely burned each other out and destroyed the potential of having a real following in Syria. Neither side trusted the other, and the ideological bases clashed.
The National Front was supported in full by Lebanon’s March 14 movement, which had formed around Hariri’s allies and family; Hariri’s Saudi citizenship and his relations with the Al Saud family made him as Saudi as he was Lebanese, and they considered his assassination a personal affront. Apart from Aljazeera, most pan-Arab media (broadcast and print) remained Saudi in financing and in agenda, becoming a platform for anti-Syrian campaigning on an unprecedented scale.
Syria was as the lowest point in its relations with Saudi Arabia, and with most other Arab countries, which had already advised Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. It is during this period that Syria’s relations with Iran, and with non-state regional actors like the militant groups Hezbollah and Hamas, began to be more noticeable, more exposed, and more mutually needed.
Israel’s 2006 attack: the turning point
By the summer of 2006, most countries were still in no hurry to begin repairing their relations with Syria, or to decrease their criticism. Israel, increasingly comfortable with its perceived invincibility, and certainly with its absolute military superiority, was beating the drums of war, first in Gaza, and then in Lebanon.
But even before Israel’s brutal assault on Lebanon began, there were clear signs that a consensus had been reached in the anti-Syrian camp. The National Front, at its London debut conference in June 2006, vowed to depose the regime and to take power in a coalition in the briefest of times, spreading the idea that the regime was about to break. More interestingly, Khaddam’s entourage seemed convinced that the regime would have fallen by autumn, and that Khaddam himself would be back in Damascus by then. It is with this promise that Khaddam attempted to gather support, even amongst Syrian expats.
With Israel’s brutal attack on Lebanon in July, accompanied by a shocking silence from Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies, and by an immoral refusal by European countries to even demand a ceasefire while Lebanese casualties succumbed by the hundreds and infrastructure was decimated by Israeli jets, the picture became complete. Israel had expected Lebanon would crumble and Hezbollah would be destroyed, if the Lebanese turned against it and blamed it for the onslaught. Along the way, Israel had also been expected to do a similar assault on Syria in order to take out the Syrian regime, turning the population against it. Rumours emerged of Franco-American encouragements to that effect, while Israel balked at the task in the face of the incredible self-defense put up by Hezbollah which no one could have imagined.
For the first time since its creation, for all effects and purposes, and in spite of the human and material devastation it caused, Israel was defeated militarily, unable to achieve its declared goals, let alone those secret ones.
Hezbollah’s major ally, Syria, was without any doubt the biggest beneficiary of Israel’s failure. With renewed vigor and confidence, the Syrian president fiercely attacked the “half men” who did not stand up to the Israeli aggression and Syrian media displayed non-stop images of the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese seeking temporary refuge from Israeli barbarity, being welcomed with open arms on every level of the Syrian state and society.
It is not France, or Qatar, or Turkey which saved Syria from isolation. It is Hezbollah.
Reversal of fortunes
Although time was needed to digest the shock of the July war on Lebanon, the inevitable conclusions were not long in coming. Slowly, but surely, the noose which had been tightening around Syria’s proverbial neck began to loosen and to fall. From every capital, leaders realized that they were back to square one, and that the attempted isolation of Syria, let alone the fall of its regime, were unrealistic goals which brought no palpable benefits.
Surprisingly, the first step towards reconciliation was not taken in the Arab world but in Paris. With the departure of Jacques Chirac, an early Syrian ally who turned into a committed opponent, the slate was mostly freed of the heavy links between the French presidency and the Hariri family, and consequently the Saudi royal family. Nicolas Sarkozy’s election in May 2007 brought a completely new approach to the region, one which included a very personal involvement from Sarkozy himself and from his closest advisors, like Claude Guéant, at the expense of the Quai d’Orsay and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.
Jumping wholeheartedly into the Lebanon problem, Sarkozy quickly realized what the Bush administration never understood in its eight years of power: any agreement in Lebanon, and any return to normalcy there, would only be achieved with the consensus of the main patrons. This included Saudi Arabia, and it most certainly included Syria.
At first, Sarkozy did try the stick approach favored by Washington, imposing demands without offering potential benefits: he didn’t ignore Syria, but he did ignore its stakes in the region. Sarkozy soon switched tactics when this approached yielded no results, however, and managed to realize diplomatically the feat which every other opponent had failed to achieve.
When Lebanon’s political impasse – one of the consequences of the Israeli war - reached boiling point, and with armed Hezbollah militants overtaking the streets of Beirut and fighting armed militants of other Lebanese groups in a sudden explosion of tensions, there were fears that the situation would degenerate into a renewed state of civil war. With the patronage of Qatar, which had grown increasingly independent of its Arab Gulf neighbors and more politically nuanced, the French president was able to help put Lebanon back on the road to dialogue, with the support of Syria. By asking Syria to help, and by acknowledging its interests, French (and Qatari) diplomacy was proved to be effective and necessary, side-lining Saudi Arabia and of course the US and its major allies.
The scene on the Champs Elysées on July 14, 2008 would have been unimaginable a mere couple of years before, when Syria was at its deepest low. In the company of other heads of state invited to the Union for the Mediterranean Summit in Paris, President Assad now stood in the presidential tribune as the famous military parade passed on the occasion of France’s national day.
Once again, France and Syria were on the same wavelength, sharing an understanding that there is a give and take in the region, and that there are no zero-sum games.
US-Israeli manoeuvres
Most Arab countries have since then completely reconciled with Syria, with the blatant exception of Egypt, whose elderly president still seems to hold a grudge against his younger counterpart, and with the exception of the acting Palestinian president, whose influence was even further diminished during Israel’s unprecedented war on Gaza in December 2008. The more Israel was violent, the more Syria and the parties it supports, most notably Hamas, were seen as the better alternatives.
For the US, and for Israel, the view was not a pleasant one, and the bid to keep Syria as isolated as possible kept going. In September 2007, Israel raided and destroyed what it claimed was a nuclear site in the center of Syria, attempting to keep the pressure going. It was the first time such a violation of Syria’s sovereignty had been so blatantly undertaken, save for the usual Israeli assassinations at regular intervals.
With the upcoming end of the Bush administration, and with the anti-Syrian campaign losing steam, the US renewed its efforts. On October 26, 2008, in one of George Bush’s last incomprehensible acts, the US carried out a strike on Syrian soil, killing Syrian citizens, again creating a new precedent with this direct aggression. While the US claimed the victims were related to Al Qaeda and “training terrorists” for Iraq, there has been little effort to prove these claims. Unable to respond in any real manner, the Syrian government took the drastic step of closing down the American School in Damascus, a testament to the frustration felt in Syria.
Until his last day in office, Bush continued to point the finger of accusation, without ever attempting to remedy the situation via diplomacy, the return of an ambassador, or the recognition (which previous administrations had given) of Syria’s legitimate rights. Syria’s position on Iraq had not been forgiven, and its open borders policy allowed the US and its Iraqi allies to claim that Syria sent the vast majority of the violent attacks in Iraq, whether they were acts of terrorism against civilians or resistance against occupation soldiers. Washington conveniently overlooked the fact that Syria also welcomed up to 2 million Iraqi refugees, not to mention that it had mostly voted to American satisfaction in the Security Council.
Having ensured the Syria Accountability Act was in place, Bush even made it difficult for his successors to improve relations with Syria, should that be a goal. Indeed, even Barak Obama will be bound by these restrictions, and by the sanctions imposed on Syria through other legislation.
These sanctions do not stand in the way of restoring an ambassador to the US embassy in Damascus, withdrawn right after the assassination of Rafik Hariri; nevertheless, President Obama has clearly not made up his mind on pushing for this.
With so many Clinton Middle East veterans amongst White House and State Department staff, Obama’s staff is not really enthusiastic about engaging Syria. Rahm Emanuel, the Chief of Staff, whose support for Israel translated into volunteering there during the Gulf War of 1991, Dan Shapiro, advisor to the campaign and instrumental in the drafting of the Syria Accountability Act, or Dennis Ross, to name but a few, are not eager to rehabilitate Syria’s position with Washington. Nor is Vice President Biden (who had advised dividing Iraq into three states), a self-described Zionist and an ardent supporter of Israel, who is also not in a hurry to patch things up with Syria.
Of course, things are marginally better than they were with Bush, if only because Obama’s administration is less strident and less ideologically devoted, but it has yet to utter a word on the Golan, on the millions of refugees from Iraq (or from Palestine) which sought safety in Syria, or on any other issue of importance. Importantly, Obama has shown himself to be excessively petty on issues which would have cost the US very little politically, but which would have made a huge difference to Syria. In particular, Obama blocked a deal between Airbus (a European company, but with a small part of American components) and Syrian Airlines, even though the latter is down to only a handful of planes left in flying condition, the rest having been grounded by Syria out of safety concerns. By targeting a civilian airline, it is clear that Obama plans to make no concessions, and no engagement.
Syria now seems cured of its initial enthusiasm with Obama, and there is no shortage of nations hoping to play a bigger role in the Middle East, and which are more than happy to develop stronger relations with a country like Syria. From the Far East to Latin America, passing by the European Union which seems to be back to its more neutral position, the Syrian president has been busy placing his country anew on the world map, politically and economically. In parallel with this international engagement, Syria has also turned its relations with Turkey over the past decade, making the neighborhood sit up and take notice.
The Turkish alliance
Centuries of Ottoman occupation had dampened Syrian appetite for most things Turkish, but the Turkey which was modern, secular, developed, simultaneously western and eastern in its socio-political outlook, and still held on to its Islamic values, was found endearing.
From being on the verge of a Turkish attack on Syria in 1998, for its hosting of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan (relenting and expelling him just before things got out of hand), Turkey and Syria took some time in getting relations back to a less hostile level, especially with the issue of water shares from the Euphrates, shared by both countries. In addition, under successive Turkish governments, the alliance with Israel had continued to consolidate, driving Syria into a more dangerous isolation.
But things did improve, even before the arrival of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkish President Ahmed Necdet Sezer had already made a point of taking a new approach with Syria, and the two countries found themselves increasingly joined by their opposition to the invasion of Iraq, which the Turkish parliament refused to facilitate by denying the US military the use of its territory for any related action.
In Turkey, just as in Syria, there had been a strong popular rejection of American policies in the region and Iraq was but one case. In 2006, the antiwar Turkish movie "Valley of the Wolves" broke attendance records, even in the Turkish community in Germany. And from 2009, there was no question that popular sentiment strongly supported the position of the Turkish government in relation to Israel. For Erdogan, there was nothing to prove to a supportive populace.
All of these policies have brought the two countries much closer, politically and economically, culminating in the elimination of customs between them, allowing for the free passage of people and goods.
A new regional order
With Turkey and Syria redrawing the map of the region in such an unexpected way, they have managed to impose a new regional order which Israel’s allies can’t merely reject and demonize with the usual “rogue” denomination. Indeed, while Israel and the US may have gotten away with throwing Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah into a simplistic “rejectionist” front, the reality is that a much more solid alliance has been forming, where size is not necessarily representative of influence.
Qatar’s rising political and economic dominance as it slid away from the Saudi sphere has created the most unlikely of allies. With Turkey in NATO, and with Doha as the headquarters of Centcom and a huge American base, not to mention trade ties with Israel, Qatar has in a matter of a few years made its voice heard and redressed the balance of influence. With the regular inclusion of France in a number of regional initiatives, and with attempts to bring in powers like Brazil and even Russia to solve the Iranian nuclear impasse, the message to Israel, the US and even Saudi Arabia is clear: the region is not only the playground of a few, but rather a common responsibility. Moreover, the key issues of Palestine (and Lebanon) were not going to be ignored for much longer, and Israel was going to have to start dealing with more than the US.
There is no doubt that the murderous Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara, the Turkish ship bringing aid to Gaza, was a turning point in Turkey’s public stance with Israel. It is also relevant to note Dubai Police’s relentless drive to expose Mossad as the killers of a senior Hamas official a few months ago. Both incidents point to a newfound determination to stop Israel from behaving with complete impunity, and to hold it accountable for its crimes. Three years after the siege of Gaza was imposed by Israel, with the assistance of Egypt, regional powers like Turkey, Qatar and even the United Arab Emirates seem to be confronting Israel and signalling that enough is enough.
Syria has never been in better company, in retrospect. Having lost its strong alliance with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and having risen up again after a period of suffocating isolation, it seems to be even better placed, strategically and politically. Egypt has become nearly insignificant in the Arab world’s affairs, through its participation in the blockade of Gaza, and Saudi Arabia has had no choice but to accept its anti-Syrian drive had failed, and to step aside while Qatar got Syrian help in solving the last Lebanese stalemate.
Ten years after having stepped into his father’s shoes, there is no doubt that the Syrian president is today satisfied with his achievements, and with the renewed importance his country holds in the region. Syria still has major issues of its own, the Golan being the most important, but it will also continue to have its stakes outside its own borders. For the long distance run still ahead, and even while Israel and its allies continue to threaten its security, it seems that Syria will be a lot less lonely, and lot more confident in its international dealings.
http://revistaculturas.org/la-soledad-del-corredor-de-fondo/
